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Abstract
In this article we propose a study of market models starting from a set of axioms,
as one does in the case of risk measures. We define a market model simply as a
mapping from the set of adapted strategies to the set of random variables describing
the outcome of trading. We do not make any concavity assumptions. The first result
is that under sequential upper-semicontinuity the market model can be represented
as a normal integrand. We then extend the concept of no-arbitrage to this setup
and study its consequences as the super-hedging theorem and utility maximization.
Finally, we show how to extend the concepts and results to the case of vector-valued
market models, an example of which is the Kabanov model of currency markets.
1 Introduction
Thinking in the field of mathematical finance and, more broadly, economics consists usually
of two steps. The first step is postulating a model for the effect that is under study and
justification of the model. This consists of connecting the action of the trader to his
outcome of trading. From that point on the study focuses on the particular model at hand
and analyzes the consequences.
In mathematical finance a model is a description of the behavior of some indicator of
performance in the market as it depends on the action of the agent or trader. The three
main problems in mathematical finance are study of whether the model makes sense, i.e.
arbitrage theory, hedging, and the study of how to achieve optimal performance. In general
the methods themselves depend on the particular model under study.
The ubiquitous assumption of concavity of financial market models comes into the
argument due to two things: first, one usually aims at obtaining the dual representation
of the set of superhedgeable claims; and second, the space of admissible strategies A in
the market is not included in a locally convex space, but due to convexity, one can use
the trick of passing to ’subsequences of convex combinations’. This line of argument was
introduced by Schachermayer [21].
Staying with the concavity assumption, it was in Pennanen [15] that was shown that the
questions of no-arbitrage and closure of the set of superhedgeable claims can be embedded
into the convex duality framework, thus yielding those results for a much larger set of
market models. However, the problem with general models is that with more generality
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one loses the interpretation. For instance, in the fricionless market model one can state the
fundamental theorem of asset pricing as being equivalent to the existence of an equivalent
martingale measure for the stock price process. Only in the case of market models with
proportional transaction costs is such a clean interpretation still possible (see Kabanov et
al. [11]).
Market models with transaction costs that are not convex were considered in Lobo et
al. [13], where proportional and fixed costs are considered in a computation framework.
They propose a heuristic, i.e. an iterative scheme, for calculating the optimal strategy and
present numerical experiments of those. See also the recent publication by Dolinsky and
Kifer [5].
In this paper we will study models of financial markets that do not satisfy the concavity
property. There are two levels of non-concavity in the market model. On one side, it may
happen that the set of admissible strategies is not convex. A simple example of this
situation is a probably realistic case where one can hold in the portfolio only an integer
number of any one asset; this one can model with strategies ϑ taking values in the set of
integers Zd. On the other side, as noted in Föllmer and Schied [9], transaction costs might
not be convex in the sense that a bigger trader could be able to procure a better price
than the smaller one per unit volume. Fixed transaction costs is a notable example of this
situation. Also, one may notice that some models of market illiquidity are not convex, see
e.g. Roch and Soner [19].
In this paper we consider the set of strategies available to the trader A as a basic object.
On a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F, P ) the financial market model will be defined as
a mapping from the set of adapted sequences A = {(ϑt)t=0,...,T−1 |ϑt ∈ L0(Ft;Rd)} that
represents the strategies of the agent in the market to the set L0(F) of measurable random
variables representing the outcomes of trading. The values of the market model can,
in general, be in any set. For simplicity we consider only two cases: when the market
model takes values in the set of random variables L0(F ;R) and when it takes values in
the set of random vectors L0(F ;Rn). The canonical variable one considers as a market
model is mark-to-market value of the final position, liquidated final wealth, or utility from
consumption.
Comparing the research of financial market models with that of risk measures, the
difference in approaches is immediately apparent. In the latter one starts with axiomatics:
a (conditional) risk measure is a mapping from the space of financial positions in the
space L∞(F ;R) into the space of L∞(G;R), which describes the required wealth to make
the position acceptable. Here, of course, one has G ⊂ F . One approaches it this way
because it is a general. Interestingly enough, the market models in the financial literature
are analyzed on the case by case basis. The main result in the risk measures stream of
literature is that under lower semicontinuity property, i.e. the Fatou property, one also has
a Fenchel–Moreau dual representation (See Föllmer and Schied [9]).
One additional comparison of our work is with the recently developed field of L0 mod-
ules (see [4]). The L0 module theory developed in the mentioned paper can be equaled
directly to our one step market model. We postpone discussion about this connection for
later research.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we define the market model, i.e. lay out
the axioms, and explain the reasons for studying those through examples; in Section 3 we
state a representation result for the market model; in Section 4 we define the no-arbitrage
condition and state its consequences like the closure of the set of superhedgeable claims
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and utility maximization; Section 5 gives an extension of the definitions and results to the
vector valued market models. In the appendix, we will collect some definitions and ideas
about measurable correspondences.
1.1 A word about notation
On the set Rn we will denote the scalar product with 〈·, ·〉. The corresponding norm will
be denoted by ‖ · ‖. Relation on Rn will be induced with a closed, convex cone K; for
x, y ∈ Rn we write x K y to mean x− y ∈ K.
The usual spaces of random variables and vectors are denoted by L0(Ω,F ,P;Rn) and
L∞(Ω,F , P ;Rn). The norm on the latter space we denote by ‖ · ‖∞, which is defined
‖X‖∞ = ess sup ‖X‖ for any X ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P;Rn). This notation will be abreviated in
the text where no confusion can arise. The same notation will be used also for the set
of measurable selections of a corresponcence K : Ω ⇒ Rn, i.e. we will denote it by
L0(Ω,F , P ;K).
Stochastic processes are time indexed collections of random variables (Xt)t=0,...,T for
some time horizon T . The increment of the will be denoted by ∆Xi = Xi−Xi−1. We will
sometimes need to consider stochastic processes as random vectors, i.e. elements of L0 or
L∞. We can then talk about their L∞ norm.
2 Model of the financial market
We will consider models of financial markets in finite discrete time with time horizon
T > 0. A trader can rebalance his or her position only at a finite number of time instances
{0, 1, . . . , T −1}. We assume that the portfolio of the trader can be described with a vector
in a finite dimensional vector space Rd.
On a probability space (Ω,F ,P) the information available to the investor is given by
a filtration F = (Ft)t=0,...,T , i.e. an increasing sequence of sub-sigma algebras of F . We
denote a sequence of adapted strategies with respect to the filtration F by
A =
{
(ϑt)
∣∣ ϑt ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;Rd) ∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1}.
Elements of the set A will be called strategies; those are the actions available to investors.
In financial mathematics one usually works with predictable strategies as there are
technical reasons for that in continuous time. In the discrete time setup this distinction is
irrelevant, as the classes of processes are equivalent up to re-indexation. We, thus, work
with adapted strategies, as this makes notation more transparent.
In models of financial mathematics one describes the portfolio of the trader by speci-
fying his or her holdings in each of the assets. So, if there are d stocks in the market, it is
sufficient to specify the number of shares of each asset that the trader is holding.
Definition 2.1 A market model, which we will also call gains from trading, is a mapping
V̂ : A → L0(F ;R ∪ {−∞})
satisfying the following two axioms:
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A1: (normalization) if the agent does not participate in the market, then his or her gains
from trading are zero, i.e.
V̂ (0) = 0;
A2: (locality) the gains from trading V̂ depend only locally on the strategy, i.e. for any
t, any set A ∈ Ft, and strategy ϑ ∈ A, we have the following:
V̂ (ϑ0, . . . , ϑT−1)1A = V̂ (ϑ0, . . . , ϑt−1, ϑt1A, ϑt+1, . . . , ϑT−1)1A a.s.
Before proceeding we first briefly comment on the definition above. First note that the
value −∞ is allowed for the market model to indicate that the strategy is not feasible; it
is effectively there in order to describe constraints in the model.
Axiom A1 is there to say that there is at least one strategy that is feasible in the
market, i.e. that gives finite gains from trading. If V̂ : A → L0(F ;R ∪ {−∞}) would be
a mapping satisfying A2 but not A1 and if ϑ ∈ A would be a feasible strategy, then the
translated model V¯ (z) = V̂ (z + zˆ)− V̂ (zˆ) is a market model by Definition 2.1.
AxiomA2 is an axiom that is always implicit in the definition of the market model. One
should compare it with the fork-convexity condition of, e.g., Žitković [22]. The intuition is
that the gains from trading should depend only on the sequence of positions taken by the
strategy and the realization ω.
Remark 2.2 Compare these axioms with the axioms for a conditional risk measure. The
fundamental difference is in the measurability of the domain and codomain of the mapping.
Let G ⊂ F be a sub-sigma algebra. Then the conditional risk measure maps ρ : L0(F) →
L0(G), where the locality property is ρ(1AX) = 1Aρ(X) for each set A ∈ G, i.e. measurable
with respect to the codomain sigma algebra.
Remark 2.3 The choice of the codomain of the market model is somewhat arbitrary. We
could have also taken as a domain any space L0(Ω,F , P ;X ) where X is some topological
space. We will see that in order to define the concepts used below, we only need a topology
on the space X and a partial relation . The main advantage of choosing R is that one
has a canonical topology and a canonical complete binary relation ≥ on it. Also, on this
space there is a canonical minimal element −∞ which we append to the space R in order
to model constraints. In Section 5 we will show how the theory transfers to the codomain
Rn.
We now provide a few canonical examples of a market model. This will, hopefully,
elucidate the argument a little.
Example 2.4 The basic model of a financial market is the frictionless market. The market
model is described completely by an adapted process (St)t=0,...,T , with St representing the
price of the stock at time t. We tacitly assume existence of an additional bank account
with zero interest rate and value 1. The final gains from trading, using a self-financing
strategy, is
V̂ (ϑ) =
T−1∑
t=0
〈ϑt, St+1 − St〉 .
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Note that 〈·, ·〉 denotes the standard scalar product on Rd, which is in this case, with d = 1,
simply a product. For the market model V̂ to be [−∞,∞) valued, the stock price process
needs also to have values in (−∞,∞). Then also every strategy ϑ ∈ A attains a finite
value V̂ (ϑ).
It is easy to see how to extend the model to more then one stock. Further extension
would be to add static options {fi}ni=1 that can be purchased at initial time and held in
the portfolio until the end of the trading period. It is easy to see how to extend the model
to accommodate this extension.
Example 2.5 To the basic frictionless market model, described by the stock price process
(St)t=0,...,T we add transaction costs. The capital gains are still described as in the previous
example, however for every change from ϑt−1 to ϑt of number of stocks in the portfolio,
the trader incurs costs gt(ϑt − ϑt−1). Those need to be paid from the bank account. The
following is the model of [6] with one stock (St)t=0,...,T and a bank account with zero
interest rate. The market model is written here as
V̂ (ϑ) =
T−1∑
t=0
[
ϑt(St+1 − St)− gt(ϑt − ϑt−1)
]
,
with the convention ϑ−1 = 0. The transaction costs gt are in general mappings gt : Ω×R→
R+ ∪ {∞} such that gt(∆ϑt) ∈ L0(F ;R) for any random variable ∆ϑt ∈ L0(Ft;R). Here
are a few prominent examples from mathematical finance:
proportional transaction costs: the costs are gt(∆ϑt) = λt|∆ϑt| for some sequence of
random variables λt > 0 a.s. One often encounters the choice λt = λSt for some
constant λ > 0, where also the stock price process S is non-negative.
fixed transaction costs: a trader needs to pay a fixed fee λ for every transaction, irre-
spective of its size. The costs gt one writes as follows
gt(x) =
{
λ x 6= 0
0 otherwise.
portfolio constraints: the possible position in the stock ϑt at time t is constrained to
lie in some set Dt ⊆ R. This gives rise to a somewhat different model of the form
V̂ (ϑ) =
T−1∑
t=0
[
ϑt(St+1 − St)− 1Dt(ϑt)
]
,
with 1A(x) is 0 if x ∈ A and ∞ otherwise.
Remark 2.6 When trading in the market model incurs transaction costs, then it is not
clear what a concept of portfolio value should be. There are two canonical candidates.
The mark-to-market value is the value one obtains by multiplying the number of stocks
with their ’mid-quote price’ and summing those up. Of course, what is a mid-quote price
depends on the model. The liquidated portfolio value is the value one would see on the
bank account were one to change his or her holdings to the bank account, i.e. having
ϑt = 0. In the mathematical finance literature one differentiates between the two in order
to get a desired interpretation of the dual variables.
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Example 2.7 Here we give a more involved example of a limit order book. More infor-
mation about modelling considerations can be found in [19]. The ’equilibrium stock price’
process (St)t=0,...,T represents the price when there is no trading; with trading, after the
trading period, the price is given with St + ℓt. If a big trader wants to execute the trade
∆ϑt at time t, he or she moves the price, so the price after trade changes by mt∆ϑt. The
model is the following
ℓt+1 = κℓt + 2mt+1∆ϑt+1
Vt+1 = Vt + ϑt(∆St+1 + κ∆ℓt)−mt(∆ϑt)
2
for some constant κ ∈ (0, 1), capturing the decay of price impact ℓ, and a strictly positive
process (mt), encoding the ’depth’ of the limit order book of 12mt. We set as the market
model in our V̂ (ϑ) = VT (ϑ) where one can convince oneself that VT is the mark-to-market
value of the portfolio (ϑt)t=0,...,T−1. A particular feature of the model is that the gains
from trading do not depend on the strategy in a convex manner.
Example 2.8 The final example will be the one in which the market model cannot be
identified with capital gains. The agent trades in the frictionless market and can also
consume a part of the money. Starting with the amount V0 > 0 on the bank account, the
agent decides on the pair (ϑt, ct) where ϑ is, as above, a number of shares in the portfolio
and ct is a process representing consumption; it is adapted and positive. The market model
we consider in this case is
VT (ϑ, c) =
T−1∑
t=0
[
〈ϑt, St+1 − St〉 − ct+1
]
.
What one is interested in here is the utility from consumption. So, if we denote by U :
RT+ → R ∪ {−∞} the utility one achieves from the consumption stream c, we can define
our market model as V̂ (ϑ, c) = U(c). In order for the model to be well defined, we need
to assume that the position is solvent at the end of trading, i.e. VT (ϑ, c) ≥ 0 a.s.
One can come up with an infinite number of additional examples of market models.
Let us just mention optimal stopping, which one can handle by appropriately reducing the
space of strategies.
3 Representation of market models
It is customary in financial mathematics to think of a market as a rule assigning to the
strategy a capital gains process. This dynamic view of the market through the assigned
gains process mainly arises from the technicalities one needs to deal with when defining
the stochastic integral in continuous time, i.e. one cannot talk about ω-wise stochastic
integral.
In the examples we gave above, the market model is given in an ω-wise fashion: fixing ω,
the market model is just a deterministic function of the path. We can write this observation
as V̂ (ϑ)(ω) = V (ω, ϑ(ω)) for some function V : Ω×RdT → R∪ {−∞}. All such mappings
V define market models, as the following statement shows.
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Lemma 3.1 Let V be a mapping V : Ω × RdT → R ∪ {−∞} and assume that it is
F ⊗ B(RdT ) − B(R ∪ {−∞}) measurable. Then the mapping V̂ : A → L0 defined by
V̂ (ϑ)(ω) := V (ω, ϑ(ω)) defines a market model when V̂ (0) = 0.
Proof. Since we assumed in the statement of the lemma that A1 is satisfied, we only need
to show A2 and that V̂ maps into the right space. But this is clear from the assumed
measurability of V .
The purpose of this section is to show that the converse also holds under some condi-
tions, i.e. for any V̂ we may find a mapping V , such that they are related as in the lemma
above.
Starting with a market model V̂ , a natural thing to do would be do assign to it a
mapping V defined as follows
V : Ω× RdT → R ∪ {−∞}
(ω, x) 7→ V̂ (x)(ω).
(1)
Constants in RdT represent deterministic, i.e. nonrandom, strategies. Those are, of course,
adapted. Therefore, the definition makes sense. Hence, by Axiom A2 we have also that
V (ω, ϑ(ω)) = V̂ (ϑ)(ω) for any simple strategy, i.e. the one which takes only a finite number
of values. However, it is not clear why the identification above would be valid beyond this
class of strategies.
One of the obstacles is that the mapping V thus defined need not be measurable or
have any regularity properties at all. In fact, it is easy to come up with such pathological
examples; see the discussion after Proposition 14.39 in [20]. The best one could hope for
is that we can modify the mapping V to get a regular enough version.
We proceed in the spirit of Proposition 14.40 in [20] and define the following set of
random variables
px,r = ess sup
{
V̂ (ϑ)
∣∣ϑ ∈ A, ‖ϑ− x‖∞ < r} (x, r) ∈ RdT × R+.
Remember that the set A contains all adapted processes, hence the family over which we
are taking the essential supremum is not empty. By definition of V̂ and of the essen-
tial supremum, these random variables are F measurable. The following implication is
immediate
s ≥ r + ‖x− y‖ =⇒ px,r ≤ py,s a.s.
The condition on the left means that the ball of radius r with center in x is included in a
ball of radius s centered in y.
Using this preparation, we now define the candidate for the map V
V : Ω× RdT −→ R ∪ {−∞}
(ω, x) 7→ inf
{
pq,r(ω)
∣∣ ‖x− q‖ < r, q ∈ QdT , r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1)}. (2)
Note that the set over which we are taking the infimum is countable, hence it makes sense
to define it in an ω-wise fashion.
As the next step, we show that this definition is good. But before going further, let
us introduce some definitions. As the concept of a normal integrand is fairly standard, we
chose not to invent new terms, but rather to direct the reader to [20], Chapter 14, where
7
the theory is expounded in great detail. Here we recall only the definition, with a warning
that we change the sign in everything that follows as compared to [20]. We are interested
in maximization and the book [20] deals with minimization.
Definition 3.2 A mapping V : Ω×RdT → R ∪ {−∞} is called an F normal integrand if
its hypographical correspondence
ω 7→ hypoV (ω) =
{
(x, r) ∈ RdT × R
∣∣ r ≤ V (ω, x)}
is closed valued and measurable with respect to F . A set valued mapping, or a correspon-
dence, ω 7→ C(ω) is measurable with respect to F if for every open ball B ⊂ RdT , we
have
{ω |B ∩ C(ω) 6= ∅} ∈ F .
Correspondences ω 7→ C(ω) we also denote with C : Ω ⇒ Rn to indicate that each C(ω)
is a subset of Rn.
An overview of the standard results from the theory of measurable correspondences
can be found in Appendix A.
In the remainder of the chapter, we will usually drop the reference to the sigma algebra
F .
A well-known representative of this class of normal integrands is the class of Carathéo-
dory mappings; a mapping V : Ω × RdT → R ∪ {−∞} is Carathéodory if the map x 7→
V (ω, x) is continuous for each fixed ω ∈ Ω and ω 7→ V (ω, x) is F measurable for each fixed
x ∈ RdT ; see Example 14.29 in [20]. Let us also mention that almost all the models of
financial markets, with the exception of models with portfolio constraints, are represented
by Carathéodory integrands.
The basic consequence of the definition of the normal integrand V is that for all F
measurable random vectors x ∈ L0(F ;RdT ) the random variable ω 7→ V (ω, x(ω)) is also
F measurable; see Proposition 14.28 in [20].
Lemma 3.3 The mapping V , defined in (2) is a normal integrand.
Proof. Let us write and expand the definition of the hypograph of the mapping V . We
have
hypoV (ω) =
{
(x, β) ∈ RdT × R |β ≤ V (ω, x)
}
=
{
(x, β) ∈ RdT × R
∣∣∣β ≤ pq,r(ω); ∀q ∈ QdT , r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1)with ‖x− q‖ < r
}
=
⋂
q∈QdT
r∈Q∩(0,1)
{(x, β) ∈ RdT × R |β ≤ pq,r(ω) if ‖x− q‖ < r}
=
⋂
q∈QdT
r∈Q∩(0,1)
(
Br(q)× (−∞, pq,r(ω)] ∪Br(q)
c × R
)
=
⋂
q∈QdT
r∈Q∩(0,1)
(
RdT × (−∞, pq,r(ω)] ∪Br(q)
c × R
)
,
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where Br(q) denotes an open ball around q with radius r. Observe first that for a fixed
ω the last expression is an intersection of closed sets, therefore closed. This implies the
upper-semicontinuity of the mapping V for each ω. When we show that each Br(q) ×
(−∞, pq,r] ∪ Br(q)
c × R is a measurable correspondence, we will be done, by Proposition
14.11 in [20]. By the same proposition, also a finite union of measurable correspondences
is measurable, hence we need to check only that the assignment ω 7→ RdT × (−∞, pq,r(ω)]
is a measurable correspondence.
So, let B = Bs(y, α) be an open ball. Then we have{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣ RdT × (−∞, pq,r(ω)] ∩B 6= ∅} = {ω ∈ Ω ∣∣ |pq,r(ω)− α| < s},
which is a measurable set, by the F measurability of pq,r.
Lemma 3.4 Let V̂ be a market model. Then for the normal integrand V constructed
above, we have
V̂ (ϑ)(·) ≤ V (·, ϑ(·)) a.s. for all ϑ ∈ A.
Proof. The statement of the lemma is equivalent to the statement that for every ϑ ∈ A,
the random variable (ϑ, V̂ (ϑ)) is a measurable selection of the correspondence hypoV . In
the proof of Lemma 3.3 we represented this correspondence as an intersection of corre-
spondences
ω 7→ RdT × (−∞, pq,r(ω)] ∪Br(q)
c × R
over (q, r) ∈ QdT ×Q with r > 0.
So, fix q and r. We need to show the following: on Aq,r := {ω | |ϑ(ω) − q| ≤ r} we
have V̂ (ϑ)1Aq,r ≤ pq,r1Aq,r . Define the following strategy
ϑq,r =
(
. . . , ϑt1|ϑt−qt|≤r + qt1|ϑt−qt|>r, . . .
)
,
where we have conveniently denoted q = (q0, . . . , qT−1) to represent the time-indexed
deterministic strategy q. Note now that by construction we have that ϑq,r ∈ A and also
|ϑq,r − q| ≤ r a.s. and ϑq,r = ϑ on Aq,r. This finishes the proof, since by Axiom A2 we
have
V̂ (ϑ)1Aq,r = V̂ (ϑq,r)1Aq,r ≤ pq,r1Aq,r .
The last inequality holds, since the strategy ϑq,r is in the set over which we take the
essential supremum in the definition of pq,r.
Definition 3.5 We say that the market model V̂ is upper semicontinuous if for every
sequence of strategies ϑn ∈ A ∩ L∞ converging in L∞ to a strategy ϑ ∈ A, we have that
lim supn→∞ V̂ (ϑn) ≤ V̂ (ϑ).
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.6 Let V̂ be the market model. If V̂ is upper-semicontinuous, then there exists
a normal integrand V with V̂ (ϑ)(ω) = V (ω, ϑ(ω)) for every ϑ ∈ A.
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The normal integrand V was constructed above and Lemma 3.4 shows that it is bigger
then the functional V̂ . So, it remains to show that upper-semicontinuity of V̂ implies
V̂ (ϑ)(ω) ≥ V (ω, ϑ(ω)). The proof revolves around Lemma 1.3 in [18], which states that
for
pq,r = ess sup
{
V̂ (ϑ)
∣∣ϑ ∈ A, ‖ϑ− q‖∞ ≤ r}
there exists a countable subset {ϑq,rk }k∈N with ‖ϑ
q,r
k − q‖∞ ≤ r for each k and
pq,r = sup
k∈N
V̂ (ϑq,rk ). (3)
We use these sequences and argue by contradiction. The proof follows.
Proof. Let us first show that it is enough to prove the theorem for bounded strategies.
So, assume that the theorem is true for all bounded strategies and let ϑ ∈ A be arbitrary.
To the strategy ϑ we assign a sequence of strategies
ϑn =
(
ϑ01|ϑ0|≤n, . . . , ϑT−11|ϑT−1|≤n
)
.
Obviously, ϑn ∈ A∩L∞ and also P[ϑn = ϑ]→ 1. Denoting An = {ϑn = ϑ}, by the locality
axiom A2 we have
V̂ (ϑ)1An = V̂ (ϑ1An)1An = V̂ (ϑ
n
1An)1An = V (ϑ
n)1An = V (ϑ)1An .
Sending n → ∞ we get the equality also for ϑ. Henceforth we argue with strategies
bounded in L∞.
If the statement of the theorem is not satisfied, there exists a ϑ ∈ A ∩ L∞ such that
P[V (·, ϑ) > V̂ (ϑ) + 2ε] > 2ε for some ε > 0. We will first outline the argument in the
case when the strategy ϑ is deterministic and then in Step 2 extend this argument to the
general case.
Step 1: For every deterministic strategy, which is represented simply with a vector
x ∈ RdT , we claim that the theorem holds true.
Argue by contradiction. Let (qn) be a sequence in QdT , satisfying |qn − x| < 2−n−1.
As noted above, since px,r ≤ py,s a.s. whenever s ≥ r + ‖x− y‖, it follows that
V (ω, x) = lim
n→∞
pqn,2−n
and the sequence in the limit above is decreasing. So, we assume that the theorem is false,
i.e. P[V (·, x) > V̂ (x) + 2ε] > 2ε, thus also P
[
pqn,2−n > V̂ (x) + 2ε
]
> 2ε for each n. By
the comment we made above the proof, for each n there exists a constant kn such that
P
[
supk<kn V̂ (ϑ
qn,2−n
k ) > V̂ (x) + ε
]
> ε. Denote by (ϑn) the sequence
ϑ
q1,2−1
1 , . . . , ϑ
q1,2−1
k1
, ϑ
q2,2−2
1 , . . . , ϑ
q2,2−2
k2
, ϑ
q3,2−3
1 , . . . ,
By construction the sequence ϑn converges to x in L∞. However, also by construction of
the sequence, we have
P
[
lim sup
n→∞
V̂ (ϑn) ≥ V̂ (x) + ε
]
≥ ε.
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This contradicts the upper-semicontinuity of the market model V̂ , so the assumption that
V (ω, x) 6= V̂ (x)(ω) with positive probability was wrong.
Step 2: The theorem holds true for every bounded strategy ϑ ∈ A ∩ L∞.
For this general case, we will follow the same strategy as in the previous step. Assuming
P[V (·, ϑ) > V̂ (ϑ)+2ε] > 2ε for some ε > 0 we need to construct a sequence (ϑm) converging
to ϑ in L∞ and P
[
lim supm V̂ (ϑm) ≥ V̂ (x)+ε
]
≥ ε.We construct this sequence in segments,
as we did in Step 1. The proof proceeds by successively (1) approximating ϑ in L∞
with a simple strategy θ with values in Qd and ‖ϑ − θ‖∞ ≤ 2−n; and (2) approximating
the value of V (θ) from above using defining sequences for pq,r, given in equation (3).
We show only how to define a finite sequence (ϑni ), such that ‖ϑ
n
i − ϑ‖∞ ≤ 2
2−n and
P
[
supi<kn V̂ (ϑ
n
i ) > V̂ (θ) + ε
]
> ε. The proof is then finished by appending those finite
segments as in Step 1. The precise notation used will be laid out in the proof.
Fix an n ∈ N. We will first construct a strategy θ such that ‖ϑ − θ‖∞ < 2−n. The
construction is straightforward and proceeds by approximating the strategy in succession:
approximate first ϑ0 with a simple random variable
θ0 =
N0∑
i=1
q(i)1Ω(i)
such that ‖ϑ0− θ0‖∞ < 2−n a.s. Of course, we need Ω(i) ∈ F0. It is assumed that the sets
Ω(i) are disjoint and that
⋃N0
i=1Ω(i) = Ω. Proceed to the next time instance and on each
Ω(j) from the previous step approximate ϑ1 with a simple random variable
θ11Ω(j) =
N1(j)∑
i=1
q(j, i)1Ω(j,i)
such that, after doing this for all j we have ‖ϑ1 − θ1‖∞ ≤ 2−n. It is again assumed that
Ω(j, i) ∈ F1 are disjoint and
⋃N1(j)
i=1 Ω(j, i) = Ω(j). We proceed in an analogous manner
until we get the approximation of the last step. Then we write
θ =
N0∑
i0=1
· · ·
NT−1(i0,...,iT−2)∑
iT−1=1
(
q(i0), . . . , q(i0, . . . , iT−1)
)
1Ω(i0,...,iT−1).
Of course, by construction we have ‖ϑ − θ‖∞ ≤ 2−n. In order to further simplify the
notation, we denote by ν a tuple ν := (i0, . . . , iT−1) representing a summand in the above
expression and denote by N the collection of all such indices, i.e.
N = {(i0, . . . , iT−1) ⊂ N
T | i0 ≤ N0, . . . , iT−1 ≤ NT−1(i0, . . . , iT−2)}.
For each ν ∈ N write the corresponding vector as qν =
(
q(ν0), . . . , q(ν0, . . . , νT−1)
)
.
Now, by the observation before the proof, for each ν ∈ N there exists a sequence
{ϑνk}k∈N ⊂ A, such that ‖ϑ
ν
k − q
ν‖∞ ≤ 2
1−n and
pν := pqν ,2−n+1 = sup
k∈N
V̂ (ϑνk).
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As in the proof of Lemma 3.4 we now notice that
V̂ (ϑ) ≤ V (ϑ) ≤
∑
ν∈N
pν1Ω(ν) a.s.
Therefore, we may also find a constant K such that
P
[
sup
k(ν)∈{1,...,K}|N|
∑
ν∈N
V̂
(
ϑνk(ν)
)
1Ω(ν) > V̂ (ϑ) + ε
]
> ε,
where we look at k(ν) ∈ {1, . . . ,K}|N | as a mapping k : N → {1, . . . ,K}.
Now, if the random vectors
∑
ν ϑ
ν
k(ν)1Ω(ν) were actually adapted for each k(ν) ∈
{1, . . . ,K}|N |, we would be done. Indeed, this set of strategies is finite, hence we can
just append those to our sought for sequence (ϑm) as in Step 1. Then, repeating the
procedure for each n we could conclude the proof as in Step 1.
In this last part of the proof we will show that the same can be achieved with adapted
strategies. In essence, we show how to extend a strategy ϑνk1Ω(ν) to a strategy ϕ that is
adapted, an approximation for ϑ, i.e. ‖ϕ − ϑ‖∞ ≤ 2−n+1, and such that V̂ (ϑνk)1Ω(ν) =
V̂ (ϕ)1Ω(ν). Fix a ν ∈ N and a k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. One can readily see that the strategy
ϕ =
(
. . . , ϑνk,t1Ω(ν1,...,νt) + θt1Ω(ν1,...,νt)c , . . .
)
satisfies all the above criteria. Indeed, the last point follows from the observation that
Ω(ν) =
⋂T−1
t=0 Ω(ν0, . . . , νt+1).
Remark 3.7 Note that in the proof we did not go on to prove that the normal integrand
is finite-valued. But the proof of the theorem above shows that this is indeed the case.
Assume that for some constant q ∈ QdT and all r ∈ Q∩(0, 1) we have that P[pq,r =∞] > ε.
Then, by the same argument as above, we could construct a sequence ϑn → q uniformly,
with P[lim supn→∞ V̂ (ϑn) = ∞] ≥ ε. But this is impossible, by the assumption that V̂
takes values in L0(F ;R ∪ {−∞}) and the upper-semicontinuity condition.
Corollary 3.8 The semi-continuity condition of the above theorem is equivalent to the
following one: for every sequence of strategies (ϑn), converging to a strategy ϑ a.s. we have
lim supn→∞ V̂ (ϑ
n) ≤ V̂ (ϑ).
Proof. Since uniform convergence implies almost sure convergence, we only need to show
that the above theorem also holds for almost sure convergence of strategies. So, let ϑn be
a sequence converging almost surely to a strategy ϑ. By Egorov theorem, the convergence
is almost uniform, i.e. for each ε > 0 there exist sets A0 ∈ F0, . . . , AT−1 ∈ FT−1 such that
P[At] > 1−ε for each t and ϑnt 1At converges uniformly to ϑt1At . We may also assume, that
ϑt1At is in L
∞, otherwise intersect each At with {|ϑt| ≤ N} for large enough N . Denote
now ϑˆn = (ϑn01A0 , . . . , ϑ
n
T−11AT−1).
From the axiom A2, we know that V̂ (ϑˆn)1⋂
t At
= V̂ (ϑn)1⋂
t At
. Taking the limit:
lim sup
n→∞
V̂ (ϑn)1⋂
tAt
= lim sup
n→∞
V̂ (ϑˆn)1⋂
tAt
≤ V̂ (ϑˆ)1⋂
t At
= V̂ (ϑ)1⋂
tAt
.
Since P
[⋂
tAt
]
> (1− ε)T and ε > 0 was arbitrary, the result follows.
12
Remark 3.9 One could now ask what is the significance of this representation result. One
way to see it is to note that for any market model V̂ , not necessarily upper-semicontinuous,
it states that its upper-semicontinuous envelope has a particular form. Note also, that the
theorem assumes sequential upper-semicontinuity of the market model V̂ , which is then
shown to be equivalent to semicontinuity for all ω.
Also, it allows us to extend the market model and use strategies that are not adapted,
by just plugging the strategy into the function V . Indeed, using locality property A2, one
could extend the functional V̂ beyond adapted strategies. This is true, but this extension is
then possible only for ’finite pasting’, i.e. one could paste a finite number of strategies. In
the language of [4], the extension is only possible to a stable hull of A. The representation
theorem states that under upper-semicontinuity conditions, one can extend the functional
V̂ to the σ stable hull of A.
Example 3.10 The following is an example from [20] that shows that even in the case
when the market model V̂ is defined as a mapping V : Ω×RdT → R satisfying the property
that V̂ (ϑ) ∈ L0(F ;R) for each strategy ϑ ∈ A, the mapping V might still lack the required
measurability. Let Ω = [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure P and Borel sigma algebra. Let
D ⊂ Ω be a set that is not measurable. The (one step) market model is given by
V̂ (x)(ω) =
{
1 x = ω ∈ D,
0 otherwise.
Taking the initial sigma algebra F0 trivial, one has V̂ (ϑ) = 0 a.s. for each strategy ϑ ∈ A.
Notice also, that for each fixed ω, the mapping x 7→ V̂ (x)(ω) is upper-semicontinuous. The
problem is that the mapping V is not a normal integrand; indeed, it follows immediately
from the definition that the hypograph of V is not measurable. However, one candidate of
the construction given above would give V (ω, x) = 0 identically, which is measurable, i.e.
a normal integrand. Also it is equal to V̂ a.s. for every F0 measurable strategy.
Remark 3.11 Semicontinuity of the market model is needed to obtain for fixed ω semicon-
tinuity of the market representation. A natural question is whether sequential continuity
of the market model implies the same for the representation. We will show by a coun-
terexample, that the answer to this question is no in general. There is, however, a case
where the result is true. This answers a question in [7] about the connection between local
(i.e. stable in their terminology), sequentially continuous maps f̂ : L0(F ;Rd)→ L0(F ;Rd)
and Carathéodory integrands f : Ω × Rd → Rd. In the following lemma we will consider
only maps f̂ : L0(F ;Rd) → L0(F ;R), which can be considered as coordinate maps. We
say that a map f̂ : L0(F ;Rn)→ L0(F ;R) is sequentially continuous if for every sequence
(ϑk) ⊆ L0(F ;Rn) converging almost surely to ϑ ∈ L0(F ;Rn), also f̂(ϑk) → f̂(ϑ) almost
surely.
Lemma 3.12 Let f̂ : L0(F ;Rd) → L0(F ;R) be a one step market model. If f̂ is sequen-
tially continuous, then it can be represented by a Carathéodory map f : Ω× Rd → R.
Proof. Since sequential continuity implies sequential upper and lower-semicontinuity, The-
orem 3.6 applies. It yields two representation integrands: f+, that is upper-semicontinuous,
and f−, that is lower-semicontinuous. Observing the construction of those representations,
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we know that f+(ω, ·) ≥ f−(ω, ·) as functions for all ω. As f+ and f− are both repre-
sentations for the mapping f , it also follows that f+(ω, ϑ(ω)) = f−(ω, ϑ(ω)) a.s. for all
ϑ ∈ L0(F ;Rd). Consider the closed valued, F measurable correspondences
Aε(ω) =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rd × R
∣∣ f−(ω, x) + ε ≤ y ≤ f+(ω, x)}.
If we can show that Aε = ∅ almost surely for all ε > 0, then it follows that for almost all
ω the functions f+(ω, ·) and f−(ω, ·) coincide, i.e. outside a null-set the function f+(ω, ·)
is continuous, proving the claim. Assume that P[Aε 6= ∅] > 0 for some ε > 0. Then there
exists an F measurable selection ϑ of Aε on the set Ωε = {ω ∈ Ω |Aε 6= ∅}, that we set to
0 on (Ωε)c. But, by the representation result this implies that
f̂(ϑ)(ω) = f−(ω, ϑ(ω)) ≤ f+(ω, ϑ(ω)) + ε = f̂(ϑ)(ω) + ε
for ω ∈ Ωε, i.e. with positive probability. This is a contradiction, proving that Aε(ω) = ∅
a.s.
Example 3.13 Sequential continuity does not, in general, imply that the mapping can
be represented by a Carathéodory map. Note, in particular, the following example. Let
Ω = R with G trivial and a map f̂ : L0(G;R)→ L0(F ;R) given with
f̂(x)(ω) =
{
1 x ≥ ω
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that the mapping f̂ is sequentially continuous with respect to any measure
having no atoms. It is, however, not representable with a Carathéodory map.
4 No-arbitrage and consequences
The classical no-arbitrage condition in the frictionless market model of Example 2.4 is the
following
T∑
t=1
〈ϑt, St+1 − St〉 ≥ 0 a.s. =⇒
T∑
t=1
〈ϑt, St+1 − St〉 = 0 a.s.
The definition says that if the trading strategy does not incur losses, then it gives no gains
either. There are two main reasons for considering such a definition of no-arbitrage, one
technical and one philosophical. First, the definition is independent of the measure under
which the condition is defined; it depends only on the null-sets of the measure P , and,
as such, the no-arbitrage property of the market model is ’algebraic’. The second reason
is that if a strategy ϑ ∈ A would be an arbitrage strategy, so would nϑ for any n > 0
and models having this property are not realistic, i.e. the trader cannot make his position
arbitrarily large in the real world.
It is this second argument that we base the no-arbitrage condition on. The idea is that
one cannot increase his or her position without increasing also the downside. To describe
the market model for large values of ϑ, the no-arbitrage condition is defined in terms of
the recession model. It was introduced in financial mathematics framework in [16]. See
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also [15] for a more general presentation. The recession arguments can be found also much
earlier in [1] in the context of portfolio optimization.
In the remainder of the chapter mapping V : Ω × RdT → R ∪ {−∞}, defined in the
representation theorem will be called a market model. That is, we are assuming that the
market model V̂ is upper-semicontinuous.
Definition 4.1 Let V : Ω× RdT → R ∪ {−∞} be a market model. The recession market
model V∞ : Ω×RdT → R ∪ {±∞} is defined in an ω-wise manner as
V∞(ω, z) = lim
λ→∞
sup
δ>λ,
|x−z|< 1
λ
1
δ
V (ω, δx).
The mapping V∞ is well defined, as the limit in the expression above is of a decreasing
sequence. By Exercise 14.54 in [20], the mapping V∞ is also F ⊗B(RdT ) measurable, such
that the function x 7→ V∞(ω, x) is upper-semicontinuous and positively homogeneous for
all ω. Note that when V is a positively homogeneous market model, then V = V∞, i.e.
the recession mapping is just an upper-semicontinuous regularization of the market model
V .
Remark 4.2 There are two reasons for restricting our attention to the upper-semicontinuous
market models V̂ from now on. The first is that we want our market model to be upper-
semicontinuous in order to prove closure of the set of the superhedgeable claims. There is,
however, a more subtle reason. First, let us note that one can define the recession market
model also in the general case as
V̂∞(ϑ) = lim
λ→∞
ess sup
δ>λ,
‖ϕ−ϑ‖∞<
1
λ
1
δ
V̂ (δϕ).
This can be seen as a recession map of the upper-semicontinuous envelope of V̂ . So, here is
the subtle point: it might happen that the upper-semicontinuous envelope is not R∪{−∞}
valued, i.e. takes the value +∞ for some ϑ ∈ A with positive probability. By assuming
upper-semicontinuity, we exclude this situation.
We now define the no-arbitrage condition. The idea should be compared to conditions
of the Theorem 3.10 in [20].
Definition 4.3 A market model satisfies the no-arbitrage (NA) condition, if{
ϑ ∈ A
∣∣V∞(ϑ) ≥ 0 a.s.} = {0}.
As a simple example, one can check that the frictionless market model satisfies the NA
condition exactly when it satisfies the classical no-arbitrage condition and there are no
redundant assets.
A slightly more general market model is the one of Example 2.5. One can easily check
that the recession market model is given with
V∞(ϑ) =
T−1∑
t=0
[
ϑt(St+1 − St) + (−gt)
∞(ϑt − ϑt−1)
]
.
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So, this market model satisfies the NA condition in particular when (St) is an arbitrage
free price process and g∞t (x) > 0 a.s. for all x 6= 0; such a price process (St) is called
a strictly consistent price system in the theory of markets with proportional transaction
costs.
Remark 4.4 This condition of no-arbitrage appears already in [14] under the name of no
scalable arbitrage and is defined for convex transaction costs and additive structure of the
market. A similar idea of the no-arbitrage condition can be found in [3] under the name
of no marginal arbitrage of the second kind for high production regimes. They assume that
the market is arbitrage free if it can be dominated by an affine market model, satisfying
the no-arbitrage condition. This also implies that it is arbitrage free under our definition.
Remark 4.5 Here is a trivial observation, mentioned in the previous remark: if V1 and
V2 are two market models, and V1(ω, x) ≤ V2(ω, x) for all (ω, x) and if V2 satisfies the no-
arbitrage condition, then also V1 satisfies the no-arbitrage condition. One can understand
the theory of proportional transaction costs through this observation: the fundamental
theorem of asset pricing with proportional transaction costs states that the market model
V1 with proportional transaction costs is arbitrage free if and only if one can find a dom-
inating V2 model that is frictionless and also arbitrage free. To be precise, V2 needs to
satisfy the efficient no-arbitrage condition and admit no redundant assets. The following
example shows that this equivalence is not true anymore in non-convex market models.
Example 4.6 In a one step model with two states Ω = {ω1, ω2} and trivial initial sigma
algebra, we define a market model as follows:
V (ω, x) =
{
|x| : ω = ω1
−|x| : ω = ω2
The market model is positively homogeneous and its recession cone is just equal to V . It
is clear that the market model satisfies the no-arbitrage condition. However, we cannot
dominate it with any frictionless market model.
Let f ∈ L0(F ;R ∪ {−∞}) be a random variable. Denote by Cf the set of all super-
hedgeable claims that dominate f , i.e.
Cf =
{
g ∈ L0(F ;R)
∣∣ ∃z ∈ A : V (z) ≥ g ≥ f a.s.}. (4)
Also, define by C the set of all superhedgeable claims in the market, i.e. denote C = C−∞.
We now define market viability. What we mean by that is the minimal assumption on
the market model which makes it sensible to talk about expected utility maximization.
Definition 4.7 We say that the market model is viable if the set Cf is bounded in prob-
ability for every finite random variable f ∈ L0(F ;R).
Lemma 4.8 Market models satisfying the NA condition are viable.
Proof. In the proof, we consider f ∈ L0(F ;R) given and fixed. Assume that Cf is not
bounded in probability and let (ϑn) ⊂ A be a sequence of strategies such that P [V (ϑn) ≥
n] > δ for some δ > 0. We will show that the sequence (ϑn) is unbounded in probability
and the rest follows by Lemma 4.10 of the subsequent section.
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For almost all ω, the functions x 7→ V (ω, x) are upper-semicontinuous and [−∞,∞)
valued, hence they are bounded above on compacts. Hence, there exists a sequence of
finite random variables (mi) such that V (ω, x) ≤ mi(ω) for each x ∈ Bi(0) in the ball with
radius i and centered in 0.
Assume that the sequence of strategies (ϑn) is bounded in probability. By definition,
for each ε > 0 we can find an M > 0, such that supn∈N P[|ϑn| ≥M ] <
ε
2 . Next, choose an
N > 0 such that also P[supi=1,...,M mi ≥ N ] <
ε
2 . We estimate
P[|V (ϑk)| > N ] = P[|V (ϑk)| > N, |ϑk| > M ] + P[|V (ϑk)| > N, |ϑk| ≤M ]
≤ P[|ϑk| > M ] + P
[
M∑
i=1
mi1|ϑ|∈(i−1,i] > N
]
≤
ε
2
+ P
[
sup
i=1,...,M
mi > N
]
≤
ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε.
This implies that also the set of strategies (ϑn) is unbounded in probability. In turn, this
implies, by Lemma 4.10, that the market model cannot satisfy NA.
Remark 4.9 The reverse implication is in general not true. The NA condition is only
sufficient, but not necessary condition for viability. Already the market model V (z) = 0,
which is not arbitrage free by our definition, does not satisfy the condition, although the
model is clearly viable.
For a random variable f , define a subset Af of strategies that superhedge f , i.e.
Af =
{
ϑ ∈ A
∣∣V (ϑ) ≥ f a.s.}.
Lemma 4.10 Let f ∈ L0(F ;R) be a random variable and let V be a market model satis-
fying the NA condition. Then Af is bounded in probability.
This is essentially a variation on Theorem 3.10 of [20]; compare also to [15]. The proof
is based on the ideas of random subsequences:
Lemma 4.11 Let (fn) ⊂ L0(F ;Rn) be a sequence of random vectors such that P [lim infn |fn| <∞] =
1. Then, there exists an increasing sequence of random variables (τ(n)) ⊂ L0(F ;N) such
that (fτ(n)) converges almost surely to a random variable in L
0(F ;R).
Proof. of Lemma 4.10. The argument is by contradiction: assume that Af is not bounded
in probability. We may choose a sequence (ϑk)k∈N ⊂ Af that is already unbounded in
probability. Then, by using the idea of random subsequences, we want to show that there
exists a strategy ϑˆ with V∞(ϑˆ) ≥ 0 a.s.
We repeat the following algorithm for every step t, starting with t = 0 and proceeding
in increasing order. By (ϑk) we denote the original sequence above and work instead with a
modified sequence (ϑˆk); the first version of this sequence, i.e. before starting the algorithm,
we define as ϑk = ϑˆk.
If the set {ω | lim infk→∞ |ϑˆkt | = ∞} has non-zero probability, denote it by A and
define a sequence of random variables λt(k) = 11+|ϑˆkt |
on A and zero outside; otherwise set
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λt(k) = 1. We pass to an Ft measurable subsequence (τt(k)), such that, by the above
Lemma, the sequence of random variables λt(τt(k))ϑˆ
τt(k)
t converges almost surely. Before
continuing with the next step t+ 1, replace the original sequence ϑˆk by λt(τt(k))ϑˆτt(k).
Denoting
τ(k) = τ0(. . . τT−2(τT−1(k)) . . .)
and
λ(k) =
T−1∏
t=0
λt(τt(. . . τT−2(τT−1(k)) . . .)),
we may readily see that those sequences were constructed in such a way that ϑˆk, after
finishing the procedure above, satisfies ϑˆk = λ(k)ϑτ(k) and also ϑˆk → ϕ a.s. for some
adapted strategy ϕ ∈ A.
Now we show that V∞(ϕ) ≥ 0 almost surely. We have
0 = lim
k→∞
λ(k)f
≤ lim
k→∞
λ(k)V (ϑτ(k))
= lim
k→∞
λ(k)V
(
ϑˆτ(k)
λ(k)
)
≤ lim
k→∞
sup
λ∈(0, 1
λ(k)
)
|x−ϕ(ω)|≤λ(k)
λV
(x
λ
)
= V∞(ϕ).
This is a contradiction, since, by construction, the strategy ϕ is non-zero and we assumed
that the model satisfies the no-arbitrage condition. Note that the above calculation is done
in an ω-wise fashion.
Lemma 4.12 Let (ϑn) ⊂ A be a sequence that is bounded in probability. Then, there exists
an increasing sequence of random variables (τ(n)) ⊂ L0(F ;N) such that (ϑτ(n)) converges
almost surely to an adapted strategy ϑ ∈ A.
Proof. We follow a similar argument as in the previous proof. Take an F0 measurable
subsequence τ0(k), such that the sequence ϑ
τ0(k)
0 converges to a finite random variable ϑˆ0.
Then pass to the F1 measurable subsequence τ1(k) of τ0(k), such that ϑ
τ1(k)
1 converges to
ϑˆ1. We proceed in this way, until we obtain a random subsequence τ(k), such that ϑτ(k)
converges to a predictable strategy ϑˆ.
Theorem 4.13 If the market model satisfies the no-arbitrage condition, then the set C of
superhedgeable claims is closed in probability.
Proof. Choose a sequence of random variables hk ∈ C that converges in probability to some
random variable h ∈ L0. By passing to a subsequence, we may assume that the sequence
converges almost surely to h. Let (ϑk) be the corresponding sequence of strategies, such
that hk ≤ V (ϑk). Now, note that almost sure convergence implies that the pointwise
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minimum f = infk hk is a finite random variable. By the lemma above, we know that the
set (ϑk) is bounded in probability.
Let (τ(k)) ⊂ L0(F ,N) be the increasing sequence, defined in Lemma 4.12. Note that
we still have hτ(k) ≤ V (ϑτ(k)). Noting that V is pointwise upper semicontinuous, we get
h = lim
n→∞
hτ(k) ≤ lim sup
k→∞
V (ϑτ(k)) ≤ V (ϑ),
which shows that f ∈ C.
Remark 4.14 The previous statement one usually calls the ’superhedging theorem’. Let
f ∈ L0(F ;R) be a random variable, i.e. the payoff of a contingent claim. We define the
price of f to be the minimal amount p ∈ R such that f − p is superhedgeable, i.e.
ρ(f) = inf
{
p ∈ R
∣∣ f − p ∈ C}.
The result above states that if ρ(f) is finite, then there exists a strategy ϑf ∈ A such that
f ≤ ρ(f) + V (ϑf ) a.s. This is clear, since the sequence f − 2−n ⊂ C converges a.s. to f ,
and by the preceeding theorem, the claim follows.
We will now show that if the market model satisfies the NA condition, then there is a
strong bound on the final wealth. We start with the following observation.
Theorem 4.15 Let V be a market model satisfying NA and f ∈ L0(F ;R) a random
variable. Then there exists a finite random variable K such that any strategy ϑ ∈ Af that
superhedges f satisfies |ϑ| ≤ K almost surely.
Proof. By Lemma 4.10 the set of strategies satisfying the admissibility condition is
bounded in probability. Here, we use that observation to prove a stronger bound. We
will proceed by induction on the number of time steps.
To show boundedness of the first step of the strategy we define the following set
Ψ0 =
{
h ∈ L0(F0;R+)
∣∣ ∃ϑ ∈ Af : |ϑ0| ≥ h},
that contains all the norms of restrictions of the superhedging strategies of f to the first
component. Note that the set is bounded in probability and also upward-directed. So,
there exists a sequence of strategies (ϑk) ⊂ A such that the following holds: limk→∞ |ϑk0| =
ess supΨ0. Since the set of strategies superhedging f is bounded in probability, so is the
set {|ϑk0 | | k ∈ N}, hence the random variable m0 = ess supΨ0 is finite.
Next, define the reduced market model, defined ω-wise, as follows
V1(ω, x1, . . . , xT−1) = sup
y∈Rd
|y|≤m1(ω)
V (ω, y, x1, . . . , xT−1).
Note that for each ω maximization is over a compact set, which implies that V1(·) is
upper-semicontinuous almost surely (see Definition 1.16 and Theorem 1.17 in [20]). V1 is
also jointly measurable, hence a market model (see Corollary 14.34 and Proposition 14.47
of [20]).
It is also clear that V1(ϑ1, . . . , ϑT−1) ≥ f for all strategies ϑ ∈ Af that superhedge f ,
by the construction of V1.
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We claim that the market model V1 also satisfies the no-arbitrage condition. First we
calculate the recession function of the market model
V∞1 (x1, . . . , xT−1) = lim
δց0
sup
λ∈(0,δ),
|x−u|<δ
λV1
(u1
λ
, . . . ,
uT−1
λ
)
= lim
δց0
sup
λ∈(0,δ),
|x−u|<δ
sup
y∈Rd
|y|≤m1(ω)
λV
(
y,
u1
λ
, . . . ,
uT−1
λ
)
= V∞(0, x1, . . . , xT−1)
Hence, if the original market model V satisfies the no-arbitrage condition, then also the
reduced market model V1 satisfies the condition.
Repeating the procedure as for the first step, one gets random variables m0, . . . , mT−1.
We can then define the random variable K as K = m0 + · · ·+mT−1.
Lemma 4.16 If the market model satisfies the NA condition, then the random variable
Mf = ess sup Cf is finite.
Proof. Let Mi be the finite random variables, such that V (x) ≤ Mi for each x ∈ Bi(0).
Choosing the random variableK from the previous Theorem, we get the following estimate:
Mf ≤
∞∑
i=1
Mi1K∈(i−1,i]
which is finite.
We now give a basic utility maximization result. The basic statement of existence of a
maximizer basically follows from [8]. We give a fairly general formulation of it here.
A random utility function U on the positive half-line is a mapping U : Ω × R+ → R
such that
1. for each ω ∈ Ω, the mapping x→ U(ω, x) is non-decreasing.
2. for every random variable X ∈ L0(F) we have ω 7→ U(ω,X(ω)) measurable with
respect to the sigma algebra F .
We will usually omit the dependence of U on ω. In the language of convex analysis, we
may say that the mapping U is an increasing normal integrand. The properties needed are
such as to make the compositum U ◦ V a normal integrand; see Proposition 14.45 in [20].
The basic statement in the utility maximization setup is the following
Theorem 4.17 Let U be a random utility function and f a random variable. Let M =
ess supM0 and assume that U(M) ∈ L
1. Then an optimizer to the following utility maxi-
mization problem exists
sup
ϑ∈A0
E[U(V (ϑ))] = E[U(V (ϑ∗))].
Proof. We may assume that the problem is non-trivial, i.e. that there exists a strategy ϑ
such that E[U(V (ϑ))] > −∞. Otherwise any strategy is utility maximizer.
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If the problem satisfies the no-arbitrage condition, then the optimal strategy exists by
Theorem 2 of [8]. To use the notation in the cited paper set ϕ(x, ω) = U(ω, V (ω, x)).
Then: (i) ϕ is measurable by assumption; (ii) it is dominated by the random variable
U(M) ∈ L1; (iii) inf-compactness follows from Theorem 4.15.
Note that in the above one does not need to assume that the utility function be concave.
Indeed, the proof of the cited Theorem 2 of [8] goes through via dynamic programming.
Only duality approaches require convexity.
It was recently shown in [17] that the inf-compactness may be removed in the cited re-
sult of [8] and replaced with the recession condition identical to our no-arbitrage condition.
The uniform lower bound on the wealth is, therefore, unnecessary.
We will give the example with fixed transaction costs, which was the main example
that motivated this research.
Example 4.18 Let S be the d-dimensional frictionless stock price process and λ > 0 the
costs the trader needs to pay for every rebalancing of the portfolio. For a strategy ϑ ∈ A,
the final wealth of trading is given with
V (ω, ϑ) =
T∑
t=1
[
〈ϑt, St(ω)− St−1(ω)〉 − λ10(ϑt)
]
.
Note that the indicator function here 1B(x) takes value 1 if x ∈ B and 0 otherwise.
The market model given by V is arbitrage free precisely when the frictionless stock
price process S is arbitrage free and there are no redundant assets. Indeed, observe that
V∞(ω, ϑ) =
∑T
t=1〈ϑt, St(ω)−St−1(ω)〉 is precisely the frictionless part of the market, from
which the claim follows. But, one can see this also directly by noticing that in the finite
discrete time frictionless market, if there exists an arbitrage opportunity, there also exists
a buy-and-hold arbitrage opportunity.
Hence we get that in the fixed transaction costs model, a utility maximizer always exists
for a (random) utility function that is bounded above by an integrable random variable.
5 Market models taking values in Rn
In this section we will show how to extend the definitions and results from previous sections
to the case when the market model V̂ may take values in a more general space and not
only R. For simplicity of the argument and mathematics, we will restrict our attention to
the case when
V̂ : A → L0(F ;Rn ∪ {−∞}),
where A stands, as above, for the space of all adapted strategies. The point −∞ is
appended to the space; a strategy taking the value −∞ with non-zero probability is deemed
infeasible.
The axioms of the market model from the Definition 2.1 transfer here verbatim. The
Axiom A1 is a normalization of the market model, stating that V̂ (0) = 0 a.s. As for the
Axiom A2, it transfers verbatim: for any t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, any set A ∈ Ft, and strategy
ϑ ∈ A the following holds
V̂ (ϑ0, . . . , ϑT−1)1A = V̂ (ϑ0, . . . , ϑt−1, ϑt1A, ϑt+1, . . . , ϑT−1)1A a.s.
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That is to say, modifying the strategy outside the set A ∈ Ft does not modify the outcome
on the set A.
This set of models encompases at least the Kabanov model of foreign exchange mar-
kets [12], and the adaptation of this model for the study of markets with incomplete
information by [2]. The thinking of this latter paper is the main motivation for our ap-
proach.
Remark 5.1 In Definition 2.1 the value −∞ is the minimal value for the canonical relation
on the set R. In the case of Rn, with a relation that is not complete, there could be more
then one notion of minimal element. One notion is to proclaim an element, denoted by
−∞, a minimal element for the relation and append it to the space. This suffices for
our purposes. Another way to think about the the minimal elements is to use the idea
of cosmic closure, see Chapter 3 in [20]. To the set Rn one adds the points at infinity;
mapping the set Rn with the mapping Φ : x 7→ x1+|x| to the open unit ball. Points at
infinity are identified with the boundary of the image Φ(Rn). One can thus talk about
convergence of a sequence (xn) ⊂ Rn to a point at infinity through the transformation of
the sequence with the mapping Φ.
The space R is endowed with the canonical complete relation ≥, hence it did not require
an explicit mention. However, on the space Rn we need to define explicitly a partial order.
This will be defined with a closed convex cone K. The order generated by the cone K
will be denoted by K ; that is, for two vectors a, b ∈ Rn we have a K b if and only if
a− b ∈ K. Equivalence for the relation K is denoted by a ∼K b.
Let K : Ω ⇒ Rn be a closed, convex cone-valued measurable correspondence. We
assume that the cone satisfies intK(ω) 6= ∅ for almost all ω. On the space of random
vectors L0(F ;Rn) we define a partial relation in an almost sure sense: for vectors X and
Y ∈ L0(F ;Rn) we write X K Y if for almost all ω we have X(ω) K(ω) Y (ω).
The positive polar of the cone of K is denoted by K◦ and defined by
K◦(ω) =
{
y ∈ Rn
∣∣ 〈x, y〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K(ω)}.
This is a set-valued map with closed, convex, and conical values. It is also an F measur-
able correspondence by Exercise 14.12 (e) in [20]. The random partial order can now be
expressed in the following, equivalent, way: for two random vectors X, Y ∈ L0(F ;Rn) we
have X K Y if and only if 〈Z,X〉 ≥ 〈Z, Y 〉 a.s. for each F measurable selection of the
correspondence K◦. The set of F measurable selections of the correspondence K◦ will be
denoted by L0(F ;K◦).
The relation is extended to the point −∞ by setting X K −∞ for every X ∈
L0(F ;Rn). Also, we extend the scalar product by setting 〈Z,−∞〉 = −∞ for each se-
lection Z ∈ L0(F ;K◦).
This, first, observation allows us to infer the order on the space Rn using a countable
family of functions.
Lemma 5.2 Let C = {Zk | k ∈ N} be a Castaing representation of the measurable corre-
spondence K◦. Then for random vectors X, Y ∈ L0(F ;Rn) we have X K Y if and only
if 〈Zk,X〉 ≥ 〈Zk, Y 〉 almost surely for all k ∈ N.
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Proof. This follows directly form the bipolar theorem, see Corollary 6.21 in [20]. So, for
almost all ω we have
K(ω) =
{
x ∈ Rn
∣∣ 〈x, y〉 ∀y ∈ K◦(ω)} = {x ∈ Rn ∣∣ 〈x,Zk(ω)〉 ∀k ∈ N}.
By the same argument as in the lemma above, one can show that for random vectors
X, Y ∈ L0(F ;Rn) we have X K Y if and only if 〈Z,X〉 ≥ 〈Z, Y 〉 almost surely every
measurable selection Z of the correspondence riK◦.
The definition of upper-semicontinuity for maps with values in Rn needs a new idea.
As the relation induced by the random cone is not complete, the concept of supremum is
not straight forward. The ideas about how to define a supremum in this setup are a topic
of [10]. The construction they suggest for the supremum with respect to cone induced
relation yields a set, i.e. a measurable correspondence in the random setting. It is not
clear whether one can obtain single valued definition of limes superior using their ideas.
In order to be able to work with the concept of upper-semicontinuity in a simple way,
we will define it through scalarizations of the market model.
Definition 5.3 A market model V̂ : A → L0(F ;Rn ∪ {−∞}) is upper-semiconti-nuous if
for every F measurable selection Z of the relative interior riK◦ the mapping
V̂Z : A → L
0(F ;R ∪ {−∞})
ϑ 7→
〈
Z, V̂ (ϑ)
〉
is upper-semicontinuous.
An immediate consequence of the definition of upper-semicontinuity is that for each
selection Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦) there is a representation VZ : Ω × RdT → R ∪ {−∞} of the
market model V̂Z . To obtain the representation theorem, we would now like to use the
scalarized market models VZ to reconstruct the market model V : Ω×RdT → Rn ∪ {−∞}
that represents the market model in an appropriate way. Let us first show that if this
would be possible, then V would have the required measurability properties.
Lemma 5.4 Let V̂ be an upper-semicontinuous market model with representations VZ for
each Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦). If there exists a mapping V : Ω×RdT → Rn ∪{−∞}, such that we
have VZ = 〈Z, V 〉 for each Z ∈ L
0(F ; riK◦), then its hypograph correspondence
hypoV (ω) =
{
(x, y) ∈ RdT × Rn
∣∣V (ω, x) K(ω) y}
is closed valued and F measurable.
Proof. Let C = {Zk | k ∈ N} be Castaing representation for K◦ such that C ⊂ L0(riK◦).
Let us expand the definition of the hypograph of the mapping V
hypoV (ω) = {(x, y) ∈ RdT × Rn |V (ω, x) K(ω) y}
= {(x, y) ∈ RdT × Rn | ∀Z ∈ C, VZ(ω, x) ≥ 〈Z(ω), y〉 }
=
⋂
Z∈C
{
(x, y) ∈ RdT × Rn |VZ(ω, x) ≥ 〈Z(ω), y〉
}
=
⋂
Z∈C
{
(x, y) ∈ RdT × Rn | (x, 〈Z(ω), y〉) ∈ hypoVZ(ω)
}
.
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The last expression is an F measurable by Example 14.15 (b) in [20]. It remains to notice
that it is also closed as an intersection of closed correspondences.
The existence of such a mapping V in the above Lemma is not an easy question. The
reason lies in the following observation: Let Z1 and Z2 be two measurable selections of
L0(riK◦). Then the natural representation for the scalarization V̂Z1+Z2 is the mapping
VZ1 + VZ2 . To show existence of a representation V for our market model V̂ one needs to
show that our particular construction of the market model representation yields
VZ1(ω, ·) + VZ2(ω, ·) = VZ1+Z2(ω, ·) for each ω.
A careful inspection of the proofs will show that our construction of the representation in
the n = 1 case yields only VZ1(ω, ·) + VZ2(ω, ·) ≥ VZ1+Z2(ω, ·) as functions for each ω. For
that reason, it is, in general, not possible to find V : Ω × RdT → Rn ∪ {−∞} such that
〈Z, V 〉 = VZ for all Z ∈ L0(riK◦). However, we do get a representation if we relax the
requirement of upper-semicontinuity of a mapping V .
Let us now construct a candidate for the mapping V to represent the market model.
One can easily check that the set L0(F ; riK◦) of F measurable selections of the measurable
correspondence riK◦ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2.8 in [4]. Therefore, there exist
pairwise disjoint sets A1, . . . , An ∈ F and Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ L0(F ; riK◦) such that
1.
⋃n
i=1Ai = Ω and the linear span of K
◦(ω) is i dimensional in ω ∈ Ai;
2. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with P[Ai] > 0, Z1(ω), . . . , Zi(ω) are linearly independent on
ω ∈ Ai.
We now construct the mapping V . For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with P[Ai] > 0 we write V (ω, x) =∑i
k=1 αk(ω, x)Zk for some mappings αk : Ω×R
dT → R∪ {−∞} that are determined with 〈Z1(ω), Z1(ω)〉 · · · 〈Z1(ω), Zi(ω)〉... . . . ...
〈Zi(ω), Z1(ω)〉 · · · 〈Zi(ω), Zi(ω)〉

 α1(ω, x)...
αi(ω, x)
 =
 V1(ω, x)...
Vi(ω, x)
 .
The matrix is invertible for all ω ∈ Ai by linear independence of (Zk), hence αk are uniquely
defined, and thus also V . Note also, that V is F ⊗ B(RdT ) measurable, since Vi are and
the matrix above has F measurable elements.
We can now easily see that the mapping V represents the market model in the following
sense: for each strategy ϑ ∈ A the identity V̂ (ϑ)(ω) ∼K(ω) V (ω, ϑ(ω)) holds almost surely.
To see that, choose an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with P[Ai] > 0. Every selection Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦) can
be written on a set Ai as a linear combination of the basis vectors Z1, . . . , Zi used above
to construct V : Z = β1Z1 + · · ·+ βiZi for some weights βk ∈ L0(F ;R). Therefore also
〈
Z(ω), V (ω, ϑ(ω))
〉
=
i∑
k=1
βk(ω)Vk(ω, ϑ(ω))
=
i∑
k=1
βk(ω)V̂k(ω, ϑ(ω)) = V̂Z(ϑ)(ω) a.s.
This implies that V (ω, ϑ(ω)) ∼K(ω) V̂ (ϑ)(ω) on the set ω ∈ Ai. Since the same procedure
holds for each i, it also holds almost surely.
We have shown the following.
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Theorem 5.5 Let V̂ : A → L0(Rn ∪ {−∞}) be an upper-semicontinuous market model.
Then there exists a mapping V : Ω × RdT → Rn ∪ {−∞}, measurable with respect to
F ⊗ B(RdT ), such that for each ϑ ∈ A we have
V̂ (ϑ)(ω) ∼K(ω) V (ω, ϑ(ω)) a.s.
To obtain a desired representation theorem, one would need to show that the construc-
tion of V is independent of the choice of basis {Zk | k = 1, . . . , n} used to construct it.
This, however, requires some additional properties of the market model V̂ , like concavity,
or of the representations VZ like that it is a Carathéodory integrand.
We now turn to the definition of the no-arbitrage condition. Above we have defined
the no-arbitrage condition in terms of the recession cone. This one is not available here,
hence we define the no-arbitrage condition in terms of scalarizations.
Definition 5.6 We say that the market model V satisfies the no-arbitrage condition if{
ϑ ∈ A
∣∣V∞Z (ϑ) ≥ 0 a.s. ∀Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦)} = {0}.
Remark 5.7 An obvious question at this point would be how to check that a market
model satisfies the no-arbitrage condition. Here we give two simple situations in which the
property is direct.
1. Let V be an upper-semicontinuous market model that is positively homogeneous.
This means that V (λϑ) = λV (ϑ) for each λ ≥ 0. Then the definition of no-arbitrage
reduces to the classical efficient no-arbitrage condition (cf. [11]): A market model V
satisfies the no-arbitrage condition if
V (ϑ) K 0 =⇒ ϑ = 0.
Indeed, for every selection Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦), the function VZ is positively homoge-
neous and upper-semicontinuous by assumptions. Therefore also V∞Z = VZ .
2. Let V be an upper-semicontinuous model for which there exists a random vector
ζ ∈ L0(F ;Rn) and a matrix L ∈ L0(F ;Rn×dT ), such that
(a) ζ + Lϑ K V (ϑ) a.s. for all ϑ ∈ A; and
(b) the market model ϑ 7→ Lϑ satisfies the no-arbitrage condition.
Then also V satisfies the no-arbitrage condition. Indeed, for every Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦)
we have
V∞Z (ϑ) = 〈Z, V 〉
∞(ϑ) ≤ 〈Z, ζ + L · 〉∞(ϑ) = 〈Z,Lϑ〉,
where by 〈Z, ζ+L · 〉 we denoted the function x 7→ 〈Z, ζ+Lx〉. A variant of this con-
dition apeared in [3] as no marginal arbitrage (of the second kind) for high production
regimes.
We now turn to explain how the results from the one-dimensional case transfer to this
setup. For a random vector f ∈ L0(F ;Rn) define a set of strategies that dominate it
Af =
{
ϑ ∈ A
∣∣V (ϑ) K f a.s.}.
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Lemma 5.8 Let V be a market model satisfying the no-arbitrage condition. Then the set
Af is bounded in probability.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the one dimensional case, Lemma 4.10. Let (ϑn)
be an unbounded sequence in Af . The crux of the proof of Lemma 4.10 is in extracting a
random subsequence ψn, not necessarily adapted, of the sequence ϑn such that
ψn
1+|ψn|
→ ψ
almost surely and also such that |ψ| ∈ {0, 1}. Denote A = {ω | limn |ψn| = ∞} and
notice that ψ1A = ψ by the assumption on the values of |ψ|. Then for every selection
Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦) we have
V∞Z (ψ) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
〈
Z,
1
1 + |ψn|
V (ψn)1A
〉
≥ lim sup
n→∞
〈
Z,
1
1 + |ψn|
f1A
〉
= 0,
i.e. ψ is an arbitrage strategy.
Theorem 5.9 Let V be a market model satisfying the no-arbitrage condition. For every
random vector f ∈ L0(F ;Rn) there exists a random variable Kf such that ϑ ∈ Af implies
|ϑ| ≤ Kf almost surely.
Proof. We have proved the equivalent claim for the case of n = 1; this general case does
not require any new ideas. Since the no-arbitrage condition is defined in terms of selections
V satisfies NA ⇐⇒
⋂
Z∈L0(riK◦)
{
ϑ ∈ A
∣∣V∞Z (ϑ) ≥ 0} = {0},
we will need to formulate the proof differently.
Define the filtration F0 = (F0, . . . ,FT−1) and for each selection Z ∈ L0(riK◦) the set
of market models V 0Z (ϑ) = VZ(ϑ). So, we also modify
A0f =
{
ϑ adapted to F0
∣∣V 0Z (ϑ) ≥ 〈Z, f〉 a.s. ∀Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦)}.
Define the random variable
m0 = ess sup
{
|ϑ0| |ϑ ∈ A
0
f
}
.
As we are taking essential supremum over a set that is upward directed, by boundedness
in probability of the set A0f , we necessarily have m0 <∞ a.s.
Now to the ’induction step’. Define the filtration F1 = (F1,F1,F2, . . . ,FT−1), i.e. first
two sigma algebras are equal to F1, the rest stays the same. Define the market models
V 2Z (ϑ) = V
2
Z (ϑ)− 1|ϑ0|≤m0 , where the indicator is the convex-analytic one: takes the value
0 if the argument is true and ∞ otherwise. So, we also modify
A1f =
{
ϑ adapted to F1
∣∣V 1Z (ϑ) ≥ 〈Z, f〉 a.s. ∀Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦)}.
Before proceeding, we check the no-arbitrage condition. Assume that ϑ is an arbitrage
oportunity for the new market model, i.e. (V 1Z )
∞(ϑ) ≥ 0 a.s. for all Z ∈ L0(riK◦). But
then, by the definition of V 1Z , we necessarily have ϑ0 = 0. This implies that ϑ is F0 adapted,
hence also (V 0Z )
∞(ϑ) = (V 1Z )
∞(ϑ) ≥ 0 a.s., i.e. ϑ is an arbitrage strategy for the market
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V , which is a contradiction to the assumptions. Now, the previous lemma implies that A1f
is bounded in probability. Define the random variable
m1 = ess sup
{
|ϑ1| |ϑ ∈ A
0
f
}
,
which is, again, an essential supremum over a set that is upward directed, hence m1 <∞
a.s.
Repeat this step for all t up to t = T − 1 and then set Kf = m0 + · · · +mT−1.
Note that in the proof we have called a collection {V iZ |Z ∈ L
0(F ; riK◦)} a market
model and used claims above for the vector valued market model. This is legitimate, since
we are defining all concepts in terms of scalarizations. Therefore, we may ‘forget’ that
behind the collection {〈Z, V 〉 |Z ∈ L0(F ; riK◦)} there is a market model V : Ω × RdT →
Rn.
We now state the classic theorem that no-arbitrage implies the closedness of the set of
superhedgeable claims
C =
{
h ∈ L0(F ;Rn)
∣∣ ∃ϑ ∈ A : V̂ (ϑ) K h a.s.}.
We also define the set Cf = {h ∈ C |h K f a.s.}.
Lemma 5.10 If a market model satisfies the no-arbitrage condition, then Cf is bounded
in probability.
Proof. The proof proceeds by the same line of argument as in the n = 1 case.
Theorem 5.11 Let V̂ be an upper-semicontinuous market model satisfying the no-arbitrage
condition. Then the set C is closed in probability.
Proof. Let hn be a sequence in C that converges in probability to a random vector h.
Passing to a subsequence, we may assume that the convergence takes place almost surely.
Step 1: there exists a g ∈ L0(F ;Rn) such that hn K g a.s. for all n. Since hn → h
a.s. then the random variable ρ = supn ‖hn‖ is finite. Now, choose a measurable selection
x ∈ L0(F ; intK) and an F measurable random variable r > 0, such that Br(x) ⊂ intK;
this exists by Lemma A.4. We can choose g = −ρ
r
x.
Step 2: Let ϑn ⊂ A be a sequence of strategies with V (ϑn) K hn. By Step 1
and Theorem 5.9, we know that the sequence (ϑn) is bounded in the sense |ϑn| ≤ Kg.
As in the proof of the case with n = 1, we may choose a random subsequence ϑτ(n)
such that limn ϑτ(n) = ϑ ∈ A and τ(n) : Ω → N is an increasing sequence of random
variables. The result now follows from the observation that V is upper-semicontinuous
and V (ϑτ(n)) K hτ(n). So, V (ϑ) K h.
We give here a simple model of a financial market that is in the style of a market model
presented by [2]. It is the basic model of a market with transaction costs. The modelling
approach comes from the first paper on currency markets [12].
Example 5.12 Consider the financial market model with d assets. The portfolio of the
trader is modeled as a sequence of random vectors (Vt)Ti=0, each component of which
specifies the number of shares of the asset the trader holds in the portfolio.
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Trading is included into the market through the sequence of orders. Denote by Md the
set of matrices with zero diagonal. Trading in the market will be encoded with elements
of Md, where the number in the slot (i, j) denotes the number of shares of asset i that is
transfered to asset j. Negative entry implies that shares of asset i are bought and paid
from asset j. Denote the space of F-adapted, Md-valued sequences with A.
Part of the volume traded is absorbed by the market as transaction costs. We will
denote by Ft : Ω ×Md → Rd the change of portfolio of the trader as a consequence of
executing the order ϑt−1, i.e. for ϑ ∈ A we denote Vt − Vt−1 = Ft(ϑt−1). Our market
model is then V (ϑ) =
∑T
i=1 Fi(ϑi−1). We will assume that
(i) for each fixed ω, the mapping x 7→ Ft(ω, x) is continuous; and
(ii) for each fixed x, the mapping ω 7→ Ft(ω, x) is F measurable.
In other words, we assume that Ft are F Carathéodory integrands; this in turn implies
that V is an upper-semicontinuous market model.
In order to talk about the no-arbitrage condition, let us specify order on Rd by defining
the order cone as K = Rd+. The no-arbitrage condition is expressed in terms of the
recession market model and one can easily convince oneself that this is given as V∞(ϑ) =∑T
i=1 F
∞
i (ϑi−1). The no-arbitrage condition is then expressed as: V
∞(ϑ) Rd+
0 implies
that ϑ = 0. Compare this to the weak no-arbitrage condition of [2] for the case of concave
positively homogeneous market model.
A On measurable correspondences
Here we list some general information about measurable correspondences. The main ref-
erence for this is Chapter 14 in [20].
A set valued mapping A : Ω ⇒ Rn is called an F measurable correspondence if for
every open set V ⊂ Rn the set {ω ∈ Ω |A(ω) ∩ V 6= ∅} is in F . When A is single valued,
i.e. A(ω) is a singleton for almost all ω, this definition coincides with the definition of a
random vector.
If A is an F measurable correspondence, then also the closure ω 7→ A(ω) is an F
measurable correspondence; see Proposition 14.2 in [20].
A measurable selection φ of a measurable correspondence A is a random vector φ ∈
L0(F ;Rn) such that φ(ω) ∈ A(ω) for all ω. We denote the set of all F measurable selections
of a correspondence A by L0(F ;A).
A Castaing representation C of a closed-valued measurable correspondence A is a count-
able set C = {φk | k ∈ N} of measurable selections of the correspondence A, such that
A(ω) = {φk(ω) |φk ∈ C} for all ω.
A Castaing representation of an F measurable, closed valued correspondence always exists;
see Theorem 14.5 in [20].
Lemma A.1 A convex valued correspondence A : Ω ⇒ Rn admits a measurable selection
ρ of the relative interior of A.
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Proof. By above, the measurable correspondence A admits a measurable selection ψ.
Choose a Castaing representation C = {φn |n ∈ N} for the measurable correspondence
A∩B‖ψ‖+1(0). One may now simply check that the random vector ρ =
∑∞
k=1 2
−kφk is the
sought for measurable selection.
Corollary A.2 A convex valued correspondence A : Ω⇒ Rn admits a Castaing represen-
tation C with all elements φ ∈ C selections for the relative interior of A.
Proof. Let C be the Castaing representation of the correspondence ω 7→ A(ω) and let ρ
be a measurable selection of riA. Then the set
Ĉ =
{
1
n
ρ+
(
1−
1
n
)
φ
∣∣∣φ ∈ C, n ∈ N}
has the desired properties. Note, in particular, that riA ⊆ A ⊆ A.
Corollary A.3 Let A be a convex valued measurable correspondence. Then the correspon-
dence riA is measurable.
Proof. Let C be a Castaing representation with C ⊂ L0(F ; riA). Then by Exercise 14.12(a)
in [20] also its convex hull
ω 7→ conv{φ(ω) |φ ∈ C} = riA(ω)
is measurable.
Lemma A.4 Let A : Ω ⇒ Rn be a convex valued F measurable correspondence. Let ρ
be a measurable selection of intA, which we assume to be non-empty. Then there exists a
random variable r > 0 such that Br(ω)(ρ(ω)) ⊂ A(ω) a.s.
Proof. To prove the existence of the random variable r, note that for any r such that
Br(x) ⊂ A, by the triangle inequality, we have for every q ∈ Qn
r ≤ |q − x| − d(q,A) +∞1A(q),
where d(q,K) is the distance of the point q to the correspondence A. The indicator is
the classical one; it has value 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise. This term in the
estimate above says that for each ω we consider only q that are not in A. The expression
on the right hand side is F measurable by [20], Theorem 14.3 (j) and Example 14.7. So,
r =
1
2
inf
q∈Qn
[|q − x| − d(q,A) +∞1A(q)]
satisfies the desired properties.
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An analogous statement can be shown also for convex correspondences that do not
have an interior.
Lemma A.5 Let A be a convex valued correspondence and let ρ be the measurable selection
of riA. Then there exists a random variable r > 0, such that
Br(ω)(ρ(ω)) ∩ affA(ω) ⊂ A(ω)
for almost all ω, where by affA(ω) we denoted the affine hull of A.
Proof. Note first, that the affine hull affA is a measurable correspondence by Exercise
14.12(c) in [20]. Then also correspondence Â(ω) = affA(ω) − ρ(ω) is measurable by
Proposition 14.11(c) in [20]. Also, the values of the correspondence Â are linear subspaces of
Rn. Thus also the correspondence Â⊥, whose value for each ω is the orthogonal complement
of Â(ω), is measurable by Exercise 14.12(f) in [20]. The statement of the lemma now follows
by applying the previous lemma to the measurable correspondence A+ Â⊥.
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